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Abstract 
China’s relationship with the Arab World; an overview 1955-1975 address China’s interest 
in the Middle East specifically the Arab Countries post Bandung conference, which 
initiated the beginning of the Sino-Arab. During the 20 years period from 1955-1975, the 
Sino-Arab relations shifts from an ideological driven relationship to an economic and 
pragmatic one. This paper will describe the commencement of this relationship mentioning 
Egypt and Palestine as the key countries, addressing the importance of both countries and 
their influence on the Sino-Arab relations. In addition to the shift of policies and the key 
drivers that influenced such a shift and analysing China’s interest in the Arabian Gulf 
countries.  
The research methodology depended on obtaining archives: one from China’s National 
Library on People’s Republic of China’s relationship with the Middle East from 1956-1975 
and another from the Kuwaiti National Archives on Kuwait, Egypt and other Arab 
countries’ relations with the People’s Republic of China.  In addition, conducting 
interviews with prominent personalities from both PRC and the Arab world on this 
relationship try to answer. Did China play a role in the realities of the Arab world? Is there 
evidence of its support to nationalist movements? Describing how the relationship started 
and how it was shaped and so forth.  
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In conclusion, the Sino-Arab relations post Bandung describes an experimental foreign 
policy in a cold war period. China strived to break its international isolation by adopting a 
foreign policy that aims to bring China close to Africa and Asian countries. On one hand, 
China aimed to lead the region and influence the non aligned countries in order to 
challenge the existing world order which brought China attention closer to the Arab states.  
Furthermore, China did play several roles in supporting emotionally or materially the Arab 
nationalist and communist movements in the Arab world. On another, Arab States were 
very cautious in dealing with China; they wanted China’s support to confront the west and 
they were careful with China’s interventions in their domestic issues. 
Key words:  
Sino-arab relations –Bandung Conference – China – Egypt – Palestine - Experimental 
Foreign Policy – Cold War – ideology – econonomical relations  
 
 
Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy was struggling during the formation of the 
nation after 1949.  The United Nations and the Security Council still recognised The 
Republic of China known as Taiwan as the legal representative of China in the international 
community. China’s involvement in the Korean War and the war on Vietnam created an 
uncomfortable relationship with China’s neighbours in the Cold War period. China aimed 
to have an autonomous foreign policy, independent from USSR, and Mao Zedong felt that 
China has the right to lead the third under developed world. As a result, initiatives were 
developed to strengthen relations with the non aligned countries specifically the Asian and 
Africans including the Middle East states which gained independence directly after the 
Bandung Conference.1   
Furthermore, China’s foreign policy was in its premature stage since Zhou Enlai stated in a 
foreign ministry meeting in June of 1953 that China needs to persuade the world with the 
idea, “We are the ones who advocate to resolve all international disputes through peaceful 
consultation and negotiations, …” _ So, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to 
pursue the slogan ‘peaceful coexistence’ as a tool to weaken the US’s position in the Asian 
																																								 																				
1	 Shu Guang Zhang, “Constructing ‘Peaceful Coexistence’: China’s Diplomacy toward the Geneva and 
Bandung Conferences, 1954–55,” Cold War History, 7.4 (2007), 510. 
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Pacific region. In addition, peaceful coexistence reflected China’s willingness to end its 
isolation  
 
from the international community. Achieving peaceful coexistence was the main task of 
Zhou Enlai, and he managed to successfully improve the agenda to present a new image of 
China in the Geneva Conference of 1954. These improvements included: new Chinese 
identity towards Asia, promote China’s economy and market, anti-imperialistic and non-
foreign aggression ideology, and finally that China’s culture and philosophy is peaceful and 
tolerant towards others. Pre-Geneva Conference, China with the help of India’s Nehru, 
established the five principles in the Sino –Indian relations, which was later developed into 
Zhou’s five principles for the Chinese Foreign policy. These principles are mutual respec t  
for  t err i tor ia l  integr i ty  and sovere ignty ,  non-aggress ion,  non- inter f erence in each 
other ’s  domest i c  a f fa irs ,  equal i ty  and mutual benef i t s  and peace ful  coexistence .2  
It is important to mention that China’s participation in the Geneva Conference was its first 
step to understand the international community and how it views China and its role on 
both international and regional affairs. Thus, the Korean War and China’s role in Vietnam 
were topics on the International Community’s discussions table.  China aimed at this 
platform to develop and maintain dialogue with powerful countries like France and the 
UK. However due to the Vietnam conflict, France was willing to negotiate with China and 
this was China’s first attempt to achieve its new image as a responsible partner in the 
International community and an influential regional power. This mentality gave China 
bigger hopes and goals for the Bandung conference of 1955. 
Unlike Israel, most of the Arab Middle Eastern countries have established a relationship 
with the republic of China (Taiwan) in 1936 with the influence of the USSR since 1931. 
The Republic of China opened its first consulate in Jeddah in 1939 that lead to establishing 
further relationships with other Arab States such as Iraq in 1942, Egypt in 1943, and 
Lebanon and Syria in 1944. By the 1950s, most of the independent Arab States have 
recognised The Republic of China which left Beijing in a disadvantageous position in the 
International community, especially among the Middle Eastern Arab countries.3   
																																								 																				
2 Ibid., 513. 
3 Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975 (London: Kegan Paul 
International Ltd, 1981), 1. 
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Bandung Conference 1955 
The Bandung Conference, held at Bandung Indonesia, took place in 1955 for six days. The 
conference was a meeting of Asian, African and Arab states in which 29 countries, 
representing more than half the world’s population.  Delegated participated to discuss 
peace and the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic development, and 
decolonization. 
China’s main challenge was to dialogue with around 22 countries that have no diplomatic 
relations with main land China, but rather recognise Taiwan or has an official relationship 
with Taipei. China participated in this conference along with Arab delegates from the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. The 
conference was a comprehensive platform, but the main points of discussion regarding 
China and Arabia were: 
The concerns over rising tension between China and the United States. 
How to develop productive strategies for China’s peaceful relations with themselves and 
the West. 
The opposition to colonialism especially in North Africa. 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict.  
 
The conference emphasized dissatisfaction with the inability of the Unites States to 
cooperate for strategic policymaking regarding China’s socio-political and economic affairs. 
Major debate criticized the West for colonialism and their international policies. A general 
consensus was reached, reprimanding the West and the Soviet Union for colonialism, and 
expressed their contempt for all forms of colonialism.  
During the conference, the Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, displayed a moderate and 
conciliatory energy that tended to calm the anxiety of some anticommunist delegates 
concerning China’s intentions. Zhou took this opportunity to market China’s Five 
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Principles mentioned above with the support of the Indian delegation headed by the Prime 
Minister Nehru.4   
In this conference Zhou Enlai had the opportunity to meet Arab Heads of States like the 
Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser and Ahmad Al Shugari (representing the 
Palestinians, later known as the Palestinian Liberation Organization), who attending the 
conference as part of the Syrian delegation. These side talks at the Bandung platform 
enlightened China on Arab and Middle Eastern issues most significantly the Arab- Israeli 
conflict and anti-imperialism ideologies. In fact, China has already chosen to take the side 
of the revolutionary Arabs like Egypt, Yemen and Syria rather than the existing Kingdoms 
such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Egypt was the first Arab country to establish a formal 
relationship with The People’s Republic of China and was expected to lead both Sino-Arab 
and Sino-African Relations as will be discussed later.5  
The significant outcomes for both the Arabs and Chinese were the Egyptian-Chinese trade 
agreement and preliminary discussion regarding the militarization of Egypt; which China 
has denied on several occasions. In addition, China promised it would not export its 
communist ideas to both Arab and African nations. It supported the Arab cause in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as it complied to continue supporting the cause within the Third 
World nations. Finally, China tried to show the Islamic states that it will respect the Muslim 
population and their religious beliefs to avoid such topic to hamper the Sino-Arab 
relations.6  
 Although China has automatically supported the Palestinian cause and took the Arab’s side 
in the Arab –Israeli conflict, the Arab countries were cautious in recognising Communist 
China due the political limitations posed by the bipolar world leader by the US, UK ,and 
France on one side and USSR on the other side. In addition, the Arab Nationalist 
movement lead by Egyptian President Abdul Nasser also played a role in dividing further 
the Arab countries and their political ideologies.   
																																								 																				
4 Shu Guang Zhang, “Constructing ‘Peaceful Coexistence’: China’s Diplomacy toward the Geneva and 
Bandung Conferences, 1954–55”, Op. Cit., 514. 
5 Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975, Op. Cit., 21. 
6 Ibid,. 22. 
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 China in its initial stages could factor in the importance of the Middle East as an influential 
sphere to exert one’s power in order to gain a leadership position in the international 
community which was divided between democracy and communism in this period of time. 
In addition, the struggle between the powers in the Cold War made it very challenging for 
China to achieve its peaceful coexistence in the Asian region and the Middle East. This is 
clearly shown with China’s confrontations with US backed Asian democracies, and the 
unnecessary boycott towards the imperialistic monarchies of the Middle East. 
 
Sino-Arab relations (1956-1965): 
Since 1955 the Sino-Arab relations depended on a key matter which is the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, or what the Arabs call the Sino-Palestinian relations. Zhou Enlai realised in the 
Bandung conference that this issue held a core value in both Arab and Islamic nations. 
China had decided to support the Arabs initiative in solving this matter. The influence of 
China’s military and communist ideology in the Middle East or Arab States is not explored 
by many researches; this is a limitation on the evidence that proves that China played a 
major role in the regions politics. However, there is information that indicate that China 
did attempt to extended its revolutionary attitude and Anti-US, and further on Anti-USSR, 
sentiments to the region which jeopardized the Sino-Arab relations.   
Beijing’s main objectives from its Middle Eastern and Arabian relations focused on: first 
that communist China is the legitimate government of China and the Arabs were supposed 
to aid China gain its international position. Second, the Arab world and the Middle East 
were considered the influential sphere of that period in which China sought to create its 
revolutionary front against the Western Imperialists. Third, China sought the Arabs 
support to lead the world’s communist movement where the soviets were their only 
competitors. Finally, China aimed to strengthen its domestic communist ideology by 
gaining support among the African-Asian nations with the endorsement of China as the 
leaders in the battle against imperialism, neo-colonialism and colonialism.7  
																																								 																				
7 Joseph E. Khalili, “Sino-Arab Relations,” Asian Survey, 8.8 (1968), 678. 
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In order to explain this complex relationship, we would discuss the Chinese relationship 
with the key Arab Countries in the Arab League and their shift of diplomatic perspective 
between the Republic of China (Nationalist) and the People’s Republic of China 
(Communist).  The regional stance on the Chinese recognition affairs depended on the 
international scene and the balance of power in the Middle East between the UK, France, 
US, USSR and existing independent states. Annex 1 show the countries that supported the 
nationalists China and others who preferred to support communist China. 
The British protectorate monarchies in the Arabian Gulf like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
supported Nationalist China. The revolutionary independent Arab states like Egypt, Iraq 
and Syria supported the Communist China, bearing in mind that this ideological iron wall 
created a gap within the Arab States themselves since Jamal Abdul Nasser was aiming to 
export his Arab Nationalism throughout the Arab States in the Middle East including 
African states.  
 Moreover, the second chart shows the Arab Leagues votes in the UN regarding Red 
China’s recognition from 1956-1965 which also reflect this divide in the political ideology 
for the Middle East and the Arab World.8  
The first Chinese Palestinian encounter was at the Bandung Conference in 1955.  China, 
like the USSR, backed the peaceful and non-intervention solutions to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Although Israel was the first regional country to recognise the People’s Republic 
of China, the US’s affiliation with the Israeli affair made it a challenge for China to accept 
Israel as a taking into consideration that China’s involvement in the Middle East reflects its 
desire to become internationally recognised as a nation, a regional power and a potential 
superpower.    
China is known to be an important supporter of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
especially after Zhou Enlai’s encounter with Ahmad Al Shugari on the side talks of the 
Bandung Conference in 1955. By 1965, China developed a direct relationship with both 
Israelis and Palestinian governments. China aimed to decrease the USSR’s influence in the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict while using this issue as tool to gain the Arab states votes in the UN.  
The direct Sino-Palestinian relationship began in 1964. Only eight Arab States recognised 
																																								 																				
8 George S. Masannat, “Sino-Arab Relations,” Asian Survey, 6.4 (1966), 216-219. 
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People’s Republic of China at that period of time. China supported the Arab Nationalist 
and Antiimperialist movement to demonstrate its support towards the Arab conflicts 
however, China used Arab nationalism and revolutionary to gain domestic support and 
legitimacy of the Communist party.9  
During the post Arab Summit Conference in 1964 the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), Fatah and other Palestinian Organizations were formed and since then they have 
received both monetary and military support from China.  In the People’s Daily of 1964 it 
reflects the Chinese government’s mentality towards the Arab Israeli conflict by stating that 
“The People of China will always support the Palestinian Arab’s Struggle for recovering 
their legitimate rights and for returning to their homeland, and will likewise back up the 
struggle of the people of the Arab countries against imperialism, colonialism and neo-
colonialism and for national independence.” 10 
In 1965, the PLO’s visiting delegation was headed by Ahmad Al Shugari, who met with the 
Chinese Leader Mao Zedong. Both sides agreed that the Chinese revolutionary ideology 
was the adequate model to be followed by the Arab Nations. Although, China tried to 
maintain its non intervention and peaceful coexistence policy towards the Arab Israeli 
conflict, it provided training, military and political ideology to the Middle Eastern and Arab 
Nations.   
The Sino-Palestinian relationship was a reflection of the regional and superpower struggle 
over the Middle Eastern Influential Sphere until the recognition of Communist China in 
the Security Council of the UN in 1971. In 1965 the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s 
office in Beijing acts like the Palestinian Embassy to China. China tried to extend its 
influence on solving the Arab Israeli Conflict but failed to counterpart the Arab-Soviet 
relations which envelopes the future of China in the Middle East. 
Another key relationship that defined the Sino-Arab relations was Egypt; it was clear that it 
held a special place in China’s foreign and trade policies. Egypt was a key player country in 
the Middle East, Arab world and Africa. The Zhou Enlai visited Egypt on his way to the 
Geneva conference in 1954. However; due to the anti-communist sentiments in Egypt this 
																																								 																				
9 Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975, Op. Cit., 35. 
10 Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy 1949-1977 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 114-115. 
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visit did not take its diplomatic echo. Egypt’s domestic politics and its anti-imperialistic 
sentiments have misled the Chinese leaders in several ways. The Egyptian Nationalist 
movement were socialist not communists, nonetheless Egypt’s relationship with the Soviet 
Union was crucial to maintain its sovereignty and fight the imperialistic ideologies in the 
region.  Egypt’s political ideology and revolutionary Nationalist movement challenged its 
relationship with other Arab and African nations.  
Furthermore, the Chinese influence in Algeria, Yemen and Syria could be described as a 
mirror to the Chinese revolutionary doctrine through supporting the liberal movements 
that seek independence from an imperialist government. As Annex 2 shows that China 
used its foreign aid projects to finance or it’s national and communist ideologies. 
Furthermore, both Egypt and the Egyptian leader had their own interest from their 
relationship with the USSR and China. They aimed to use them as counter superpower to 
the west in order to protect the Arab Nationalism and the Arab-Israeli cause. Thus, they 
did not want them to pursue their own interest and influence in the region, and making it 
China’s main challenge and concern. 
China and Egypt relations were based on political, economical and social exchange from 
1956. Egypt promoted the People’s Republic of China within the Arab league and other 
Arab and African nations. The trade exchange between China and Egypt has grown 
significantly between the period 1951-1955 in which Chinese imports from Egypt have 
increased from 0.9 million to 24 million dollars and Chinas exports to Egypt remained 
almost stable around  0.9 million dollars in the given period.  This is considered a drive to 
deepen economic ties between both countries after the Bandung Conference where they 
assigned trade agreements, in which China opened an economic and trade office in Cairo 
since 1956.11   
China supported the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian President Jamal 
Abdul Nasser “The Suez Canal, which served international monopoly capital for eighty six 
years, has now been liberated … vow the Egyptian people’s determined stand against 
imperialistic intervention” 12 This speech was circulated in Chinese Media and China 
offered to send volunteers around 280,000 people to help the Suez battle according to 
Egyptian embassy in Beijing November 1956.   
																																								 																				
11 Ibid,. 33. 
12 Joseph E. Khalili, “Sino-Arab Relations,” Asian Survey, 8.8 (1968), 681. 
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Moreover, Mao Zedong has received the Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic 
General Mohammed Ebraheem in 1956 to discuss military and operation tactics and the 
support needed from China. The Chinese leader as always has supported China’s 
revolutionary tactics and was eager to play a role in the Arab and Middle Eastern Conflicts.   
In 1963, Zhou Enlai made a historical visit to Cairo, the capital of the United Arab 
Republic (Egypt and Syria)  as part of his first Arab tour where he met with the Egyptian 
President Abdul Nasser, (Annex 4 for Photograph). During this trip Zhou wanted to stress 
on China’s main policies towards the Arab countries. First, China vowed to support the 
Arab people on their battle for independence.  Second, China would adopt a non bias 
stance and a neutral policy towards the Arab states. Third:  China supported the unity and 
sovereignty of the Arab States and would adopt a non-intervention and peaceful 
coexistence policy towards the Arab states and their conflicts.   
According to H.E. Dr. Noman Mohammed Galal Egyptian Ambassador to China from 
1998-2001 mentioned in the interview that he believes that technology share and economic 
development are China’s main interest in the Arab region today however; China of the 
1950’s interest n the Arab world can be described as political to break the China’s isolation 
as well as balancing the Soviet influence in the region. Economically, China was interest to 
trade and sell some weapons to the region. Furthermore, there might have been intent to 
support communist- revolutionist ideologies in the region.13 
On another note, Yitzhak Shichor argues that referring to Egypt, the Chinese noted that 
‘all classes have raised their level of national consciousness’ and were read ‘to throw out the 
foreign aggressors’. He defends the idea that Chinese communication they support the 
Arab world’s independent (revolutionary movements) but not ignoring the communist 
parties in those countries.14  
In other terms, the Chinese- Egyptian relation could summarised in to 3 main points; 
China’s supports Soviet Union’s arm sale to Egypt, establishing a union bloc China, Soviet 
Union and other Arab countries to fight imperialist movements and finally, opening 
cooperation opportunities between China, Africa and the Arab World. During the Soviet – 
																																								 																				
13 http://www.mei.edu/profile/mohamed-noman-galal 
14 Shichor Yitzhak, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy 1949-1977, Op. Cit., 17. 
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China conflict Egypt was a key country in which this conflict is clearly shown in the Arab 
World, in which it aims to balance the relations between these two important communist 
countries.     
Furthermore China and Egypt both valued each country’s social, cultural and religious 
differences. There were several student, scholar and sport exchanges between both 
countries from 1954 in order to develop their people to people exchange and to build a 
bridge of knowledge and understanding between their nations as a whole (shown in Annex 
3). 
 
Sino Arab Relations 1966-1975 
Although the geopolitics of the Middle East was starting to change, China communist 
party’s doctrine and its foreign policy were not in favour of recognising the British 
protectorate monarchies of the Arabian Gulf even after they gained their independence 
post 1961 such as Kuwait for example.  The main reasons were that China was in tune with 
the Liberation Movement that supported the Arab Nationalism promoted by President 
Jamal Abdul Nasser, and it was known that he was in a power struggle with the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia in the leadership of the Arab and Islamic Nations. In addition, most of 
these monarchies still recognised the republic of China (Taiwan) and had a diplomatic 
relationship which China which posed as a diplomatic and ideological challenge.   
Moreover, China had played a role in supporting the Arab Liberation Movement from 
Darfur of Sudan to the liberation movement in Kuwait.  This movement wanted to have an 
Arab nationalistic government that Abdul Nasser has called upon.  This movement posed a 
national threat to many of the Gulf States specially Oman during the Omani War from 
1955-1975 and during the independence period of Kuwait until 1961.15   
 
 
 
																																								 																				
15 Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975, Op. Cit., 175-177. 
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Sino Kuwaiti Relations  
Zhou Enlai congratulated Kuwait’s Amir Sheikh Abdullah Salim Al-Sabah on Kuwait’s 
Independence in 1961 (Chinese National Library Document) since then Kuwait tried to 
gain the international community’s recognition just as China was doing at that time. On 
one hand China kept an eye on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi sovereignty conflict and how the 
international community dealt with recognizing Kuwait’s independence through approving 
Kuwait’s membership in the United Nations in 1963. Kuwait was perceived as the door to 
the rest of the Arabian Gulf countries, the shift in China’s policy towards the Gulf 
Monarchies is well narrated in the case of the Sino Kuwaiti, and the Sino Omani relations. 
In 1965 Kuwait and China have begun exchanging friendly official and non official 
delegations most importantly the visit of the Kuwaiti Assistant Under secretary to establish 
a trade and economic relation with china as shown in Annex 3.  
 It is important to mention that China and Iraq have established a very close diplomatic 
and trade relation. After the fall of the Iraqi monarchy China and the Iraqi new regime 
sought this opportunity as a have a brotherly pact which delayed both Kuwait’s recognition 
of China and vice versa.16  
According to H.E. Faisal Al- Ghais (Kuwaiti Ambassador to China from 2003 to 2009), 
Kuwait and China had economic relations pre 1965 and the Taiwan question impeded an 
early official diplomatic relations, in addition to Kuwait’s late admission as a member in the 
UN in 1963. Kuwait had a positive image of China and voted in favour of China’s 
reinstatement in UNSC in 1971. He said the Finance Minister’s visit to China in 1965 was 
economically driven to enhance trade and economic development.  
Answering the question whether China did actually support national movements in the 
region, he said there was no evidence that China had supported financially or militarily any 
regional communist parties however he had heard about relations between communist 
parties in the region with China. No one can find out about this movement in Kuwait 
today because the major leaders of the Pan Aran and communist movement have passed 
away already and did not document much of their work or information.   
Another prominent Kuwaiti personality agrees that Dr. Hashim Behbahani is one of the 
only Kuwaiti and Arab researchers that was able to discuss China’s role  
																																								 																				
16  Ibid,. 202-205. 
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and support to the region and its conflict specially  with regards to Oman and the Omani 
War and the communist movement in Kuwait. He added that any evidence he found and 
argued in his PhD research has been used as bases for other researchers who later explored 
the same topic. 
In 1972, Kuwait appointed its first ambassador to Beijing and in 1974, the president of the 
Kuwaiti Parliament Khaled Al Ghunaim visited China and met with Zhou Enlai (refer to 
Annex 4 for picture) to enhance Sino- Kuwaiti political, social, economic and cultural 
familiarisation, which then led to the signature of an economic bilateral agreement in 1977 
and other bilateral cooperation. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait) 
Moreover, in 1970’s we noticed a shift in China’s foreign policy in which it started to pay 
more attention to a pragmatic approach towards the region. This came as a direct result of 
the Sino-US improved relations in addition to Mao’s ‘Theory of the Three Worlds’17 
mentioned in Deng Xiao Ping’s speech to the UN. Such a policy shift bought China closer 
to the Arabian Gulf countries which include Iraq and Iran, as well as revaluates the existing 
relations with countries like Egypt, Yemen and Oman.  
 
Conclusion 
The Sino-Arab relations post Bandung describes an experimental foreign policy in a cold 
war period. China strived to break its international isolation by adopting a foreign policy 
that aims to bring China close to Africa and Asian countries. China aimed to lead the 
region and influence the non-aligned countries in order to challenge the existing world 
order which brought China attention closer to the Arab states.  China realised that opening 
a front close to its borders was a very dangerous taking, Vietnam and Korea and as an 
example. So, the Middle East became a battlefield for the western superpowers and a 
platform for China to exercise their powers in the race towards regional and international 
																																								 																				
17 Chairman Mao Zedong set forth his strategic thinking of the division of the three worlds. He observed, "In 
my view, the United States and the Soviet Union belong to the first world. The in-between Japan, Europe and 
Canada belong to the second world. The third world is very populous. Except Japan, Asia belongs to the 
third world. So does the whole of Africa and Latin America". At the 6th Special Session of the UN General 
Assembly held in April 1974, Deng Xiaoping expounded the strategic thinking of Mao Zedong on the 
division of the three worlds.  
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leadership. Moreover, gaining the recognition of more Arab and African States could 
guarantee a ticket to China’s recognition in the UN.  
However, the Arab States were very cautious in dealing with China. On one hand they 
wanted China’s support to confront the west and on the other hand they were against 
China’s intervention in their domestic issues to large extent.   
Jamal Abdul Nasser regarded the encounter with China at Bandung as a great opportunity 
to gain support in the Palestinian –Israeli conflict and an opportunity to add another player 
to create a balance in the Middle Eastern power struggle.    
Furthermore, China’s success in the region faced two major challenges; one the USSR’s 
influence and the anti-communist sentiments in the region, and second, the Taiwanese 
strong diplomatic presence. According several Arab Media, there were massive trade of 
Chinese products at that time and the Arab Media was very much influenced by Mao’s red 
book and the revolutionary ideology. China was able to influence the region by supporting 
many liberation movements and liberation front’s in several Arab states such as Algeria, 
Yemen and Palestine via emotional such as media support by using words like ‘our 
Brothers’, fighting ‘imperialism’ and defending the national.  In addition to material 
support represented by financial aids, it was also providing aid and investments to many 
Arab Projects such as the Suez Canal shown in Annex 2. 
Moreover, China’s foreign policy could be described as premature during the 50’s and the 
beginning of the 60’s nonetheless, it managed to balance the most important conflict that 
existed in the Middle East even today the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even if China supported 
the Arab’s position yet it was always in favour for the peaceful existence between Palestine 
and Israel, nevertheless China has officially recognised the state of Israel only in 1992. This 
does not mean that there was no trade and unofficial relations since Israeli’s recognition of 
China in 1950.  
In addition, the Sino Arabian Gulf rapprochement could be described as cautious move 
from both sides in the bipolar world; China’s pragmatic shift and change after the Cultural 
Revolution and reinstatement in the UN, gave it a stronger stance and more independent 
foreign policy at a time in which the Arabian Gulf countries were just established and are 
striving for international recognition. After 1971, China began to establish formal 
relationship with these states, most significantly Kuwait, which is primarily driven by 
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economic and trade interests. Since then China aimed to use the Sino-Kuwaiti relationship 
as a key tool to penetrate the other Arabian Gulf countries relying on Kuwait’s strong 
relationship with its neighbouring Arab monarchies. In regards to China’s influence on the 
Arab National movement and Communists movements in Kuwait, we can argue that there 
are no sufficient evidence to prove or demonstrate a link between China (its embassy in 
Cairo and these movements). 
Finally, it is important to mention that China’s role in the Middle East starts to change in 
the 70’s but it does not mean it remained passive towards regional conflicts as it supported 
the Arab oil embargo of 1973 for example. 18   The 70’s remain a period in which both side, 
the Chinese and the Arabian Gulf started to understand one another and plan the their 
cooperation framework in many fields, political, economic , social and so forth. 
 
Bibliography 
Primary resources: 
Kuwaiti National Documents (1961-1990) 
Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs Documents(1061-1990) 
Chinese National Library Documents(1961-1995) 
Interviews: 
H.E. Mohammad Noman Galal -Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the 
People’s Republic of China (1998-2001) 
H.E. Faisal Al- Ghais - Kuwaiti Ambassador to China from 2003 to 2009 
Secondary Resources: 
Shichor, Yitzhak. The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy 1949-1977. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979. 
																																								 																				
18 John Calabrese, China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East (London: Pinter Publisher Limited, 1991), 73-
74. 
Entremons. UPF Journal of World History. Número 9 (Juny 2017) 
Alanoud ALSABAH  
China’s Relations with the Arab World Post Bandung Conference: An overview 1955-1975 
	 16	16 
Behbehani, Hashim S. H. China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975. London: Kegan 
Paul International Ltd, 1981. 
Bin, Huwaidin Mohammed. China’s Relations with Arabia and the Gulf 1949-1999. 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. Kindle Version. 
Calabrese, John. China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East. London: Pinter Publisher 
Limited, 1991. 
Deng, Yong; Wang, Fei-Ling. China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy. 
Rowman &Littlefield publishers, 2005. Kindle Version. 
Khalili, Joseph E. “Sino-Arab Relations,” Asian Survey, 8.8 (1968): 678-690. 
Disney, Nigel. “China and the Middle East,” Middle Eater Research and Information Project 
reports, 63 (1977): 3-18. 
Harris, Lillian Craig. “China’s Response to Perceived Soviet gains in the Middle East,” 
Asian Survey, 20.4 (1980): 362-372. 
Shichor, Yitzhak. “Just Stand and Just Struggle: China and the Peace Process in the Middle 
East”, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 5 (1981): 39-52. 
Masannat, George S. “Sino-Arab Relations,” Asian Survey, 6.4 (1966): 216-226. 
Zhang, Shu Guang. “Constructing ‘Peaceful Coexistence’: China’s Diplomacy toward the 
Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954–55”, Cold War History, 7.4 (2007): 509-528. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entremons. UPF Journal of World History. Número 9 (Juny 2017) 
Alanoud ALSABAH  
China’s Relations with the Arab World Post Bandung Conference: An overview 1955-1975 
	 17	17 
Annex 1 
 
Entremons. UPF Journal of World History. Número 9 (Juny 2017) 
Alanoud ALSABAH  
China’s Relations with the Arab World Post Bandung Conference: An overview 1955-1975 
	 18	18 
 
Entremons. UPF Journal of World History. Número 9 (Juny 2017) 
Alanoud ALSABAH  
China’s Relations with the Arab World Post Bandung Conference: An overview 1955-1975 
	 19	19 
Annex 2  
 
 
 
 
(Shichor p. 208-209) 
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Annex 3 Sino-Arab delegation exchanges 1956-75  
( Behbehani & Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
Arabs 
Type Date 
Egyptian Trade Delegation 1956 
Egyptian Historical 
Cultural 
1956 
Egyptian Students 
Delegation 
1956 
Egyptian Artists Delegation 1956 
Ahmad Shugairi-PLO 1956 
Israeli Communist Party 
Delegation 
1959 
Kuwaiti Friendship 
Delegation 
1965 
Kuwaiti Assistant 
Undersecretary  
1965 
Ahmad shugairi- PLO 1966 
Palestinian Authority 
Yasser Arafat  
1970 
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Khaled AlGhnaim 
President of the Kuwaiti 
Parliament 
1974 
 
 
 
 
Chinese  
Type  Country  Date  
Trade Mission Saudi Arabia 1956 
Youth Delegation Egypt 1956 
Pilgrimage  Saudi Arabia 1958 
Journalist Delegation Egypt 1957 
Cultural delegation Egypt 1957 
Military Mission Egypt  1958 
Vice-Minister of 
Agriculture 
Egypt 1961 
Primer Zhou Enlai Egypt 1963 
Medical Delegation Egypt  1964 
Primer Zhou Enlai Egypt 1965 
Friendship delegation Kuwait  1965 
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Football team Kuwait 1966 
Economic and Trade 
delegation 
Kuwait 1967 
Agriculture delegation Kuwait 1967 
Government Official 
Delegation 
Kuwait 1974- after establishing 
diplomatic relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4- Photographs 
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1.1 Zhou Enlai’s Speech at Bandung in 1955. 
 
 
1.2 Zhou Enlai and Jamal Abdul Nasser’s meeting in 1963 in Cairo. 
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1.3 Zhou Enlai with Yasser Arafat the head of the Palestinian Authority in 1970. 
 
1.4 The Kuwaiti Parliament Khaled Al Ghunaim with Zhou Enlai in Beijing in 1974.  
 
